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Banking Deregulation 
"Deregulation" today is one of  the most 
topical issues in Washington. But the deregu-
lation movement is not new, and, in fact, the 
Reagan Administration's deregulation pro-
gram has yet to take shape. It remains to be 
seen just how sweeping such a program will 
become, for the prior Administration and 
Congress already had embarked on a deregu-
lation program of  their own, only to see regu-
lations reviewed, rewritten, and simplified-
but seldom dismantled. 
Few industries are as thorough Iy embell ished 
with regulations as the banking industry. On 
the one hand, there is a host of laws and 
regulations that influence banks' internal 
operations and relationships with customers, 
such as Truth-in-Lending. These regulations 
are surrounded by controversy, but they are 
unlikely to be removed. In fact, new laws, 
such as the Community Reinvestment Act, 
have added to this type of regulatory burden 
in recent years. 
On the other hand, there is an even more 
encompassing legal and regulatory net that 
circumscribes allowable prices (principally, 
deposit rates), product lines, and geographic 
markets of  depository and other financial in-
stitutions. Many of  these restrictions arose out 
ofthe financial collapse and banking panic of 
the early 1930's. With the intention of "estab-
lishing a sound financial system," Congress 
passed the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-
Steagall Act), the Banking Act of 1935, and 
the securities acts of 1933 and 1934. Taken 
together, these laws placed banking and se-
curities markets under a comprehensive reg-
ulatory umbrella, which (amongotherthings) 
prohibited explicit interest on demand de-
posits, created the authority for (Regulation 
Q) time-deposit rate ceilings, and drew a line 
between commercial banking and invest-
ment banking. (Restrictions on interstate 
banking and intrastate branching already 
were in place in the form of state laws that 
were federally sanctioned by the McFadden 
Act of 1927). Regardless of the originallegi.s-
lators"intent, this legislative amalgam in 
practice has tended to limit competition and 
to place a regulatory wrench in the efficient 
operations of  the financial system. 
Regulations and innovation 
Quite naturally, financial institutions over 
time have innovated in an attempt to avoid 
such restrictions. For example, as a conse-
quence of restrictions on geographic markets 
(McFadden Act and state laws), product lines 
(Glass-Steagall) and maximum deposit rates 
(Banking Act of 1935 and Reg. Q), banks 
have utilized the holding company device as 
the most effective means of increasing com-
petition and services. But Congress acted to· 
close off this avenue-first by passing the 
Bank HoldingCompany Act of 1956, then by 
adding amendments in 1966 and 1970, and 
then by enhancing these laws with complex 
regulatory structures. The situation has been 
similar with deposit rate ceilings: regulations 
have proliferated in pursuit of innovations. 
Despite regulatory attempts to plug the dike, 
high and variable interest rates have rapidly 
eroded the effectiveness of deposit rate cei l-
ings. While open-market rates have surged 
well above the ceilings on traditional depos-
its, variable rates have increased the risk of 
long-term financial commitments. Thus, 
savers are demanding ceiling-free short-term 
savings vehicles. But the vestiges of Reg. Q 
continue to distort price competition for con-
sumerdeposits, while the straightjacket of  the 
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from offer-
ing deposit-like securities to consumers. Al-
though securities firms seemingly are freer to 
compete, they cannot offer primary transac-
tion accounts and make unrestricted loans. 
Thus, we have tended to create two layers of 
intermediation -a  securities industry that 
avoids Reg. Q and geographic restrictions by 
prepackaging depositor funds, and a banking 
industry that sells "jumbo" certificates to the securities industry, offers primary transaction 
accounts, and makes loans. The ultimate 
solution shou Id be relatively efficient, incor-
porating both national prepackagers of  small 
deposits and local lenders who buy their 
funds in national money markets. While this 
process has yet to reach maturity, both na-
tional markets eventually should develop to 
the point where the small depositor and the 
small depository institution share fully in this 
relatively unconstrained two-tier process of 
financial intermediation. The market will 
have successfully circumvented Reg. Q, 
Glass-Steagall, and McFadden. 
Monetary Control Act 
Depository institutions, Congress, and regu-
lators alike have become increasingly con-
cerned about the fragmentizing effect of 
regulation on financial intermediation. The 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) repre-
sents a significant (although limited) step in 
dismantling this massive legislative and regu-
latory framework. Foremost, it called for 
phaseout of Reg. Q deposit-rate ceilings over 
a six-year period ending April 1986. (For 
specifics, see "Deposit Deregulation," the 
author's Weekly Letter of  April 1  0, 1981.) The 
Act also allowed banks and thrifts to offer 
interest-bearing transaction (NOW) accounts 
nationwide as of  the beginning of this year, 
overrode state mortgage usury ceilings, and 
somewhat expanded the lending powers of 
thrift institutions. Despite many other aspects 
of  the Act, its most profound consequences 
wi  II come from the expansion of checki ng 
privileges to thrifts, payment of interest 
on checking balances (eventually at market-
determined rates), and (ultimately) payment 
of market-determined rates on all bank and 
thrift deposits. 
But the MCA is si lent on other crucial aspects 
of deregulation. It bypasses the issue of geo-
graphic restrictions on interstate banking and 
intrastate branching. And despite its expan-
sion of  thrift lending and deposit powers, it is 
also silent on other product-line issues facing 
banks and thrifts. 
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Glass-Steagall and Mcfadden 
Reg. Q deposit ceilings and the resultant 
growth of  money-market funds and bank-like 
brokerage services have brought product-line 
issues to the forefront. Accordingly, the ulti-
mate removal of  deposit ceilings will ease 
most of  this pressure, for the real  issue is not 
whether banks can offer securities, but 
whether they can offer market yields. But 
other issues remain -broader lending pow-
ers for thrifts, broader underwriting rules for 
depository institutions, and, most important-
ly, expanded opportunities for depository 
institutions to offer comprehensive personal 
cash-management services. 
Under our fragmented structure, the con-
sumer needs an intermediary to deal with the 
intermediaries. (Presently, the brokerage in-
dustry seems to have the legal and regulatory 
advantage in that it is relatively free to create 
bank-like services, while Glass-Steagall pre-
vents banks from offering brokerage-like ser-
vices.) While economic forces suggest that 
Glass-Steagall restrictions make little sense 
and will become increasingly fragile, politi-
cal realities suggest that breakdowns in cur-
rent product-nne restrictions will occur slow-
ly and only at the fringes, such as permission 
for banks to underwrite municipal revenue 
bonds. Both the regulated and the regulators 
will be tempted to form political coalitions to 
protect existing turfs if  threatened with genu-
i  ne redefi n itions of bou ndaries. 
The International Banking Act of 1978 called 
for a review of  geographic restrictions in 
banking, and as a result, the Carter Adminis-
tration early this year released its so-called 
"McFadden Act Report." The report pro-
posed to expand interstate banking through 
the holding-company vehicle, largely be-
cause it would minimize the threat to the 
existing dual-banking system of  state and 
nationally-chartered institutions. 
I  n the context of the McFadden Act Report, 
what direction might geographic deregula-
tion take in the 1980's? First, banking or-
ganizations might gain permission to bid for takeovers of failing banks or thrifts across 
state lines -a  step that wou  Id e9-se the prob-
lems of regulators in their efforts to effect 
smooth transitions of failing institutions. Al-
though some members of  Congress have 
already introduced bills to this effect, the 
issue remains difficult. Second, holding 
companies or their banks might gain permis-
sion to expand or extend their deposit and 
loan facilities across state lines within metro-
pol itan areas. (Such activities, however, 
might be restricted initially to deposits 
through automatic-teller machines.) Finally, 
we might eventually see interstate acquisi-
tions in contiguous states or within special 
regions, through bilateral or multi-lateral 
changes ill state laws (California-New York, 
for example), or by changes in the Douglas 
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company 
Act. As a political compromise, permission to 
cross state lines through merger or acquisi-
tions might be limited to smaller institu-
tions-which would limit large holding 
companies to de novo entry or perhaps to 
operating across state lines only in large 
metropol  itan areas. 
While complete deregulation would be desir-
able from an economic standpoint, even 
these limited changes are not likely to come 
about easily. But geographic deregulation 
will come eventually, largely because the 
banking industry already is effectively ex-
panding nationwide (except for direct deposit 
and loan facilities), and still is losing ground 
to other industries that can expand nationally 
without restrictions. 
Economic forces 
High and variable interest rates are the single 
most important force promoting deregula-
tion. In response to this problem, Congress 
included the phaseout of Reg. Q as a central 
part of  the MCA. But changing technology 
also is a major force promoting deregulation. 
Automatic-teller machines (ATMs) and point-
of-sale terminals already are economically 
viable, and are proving increasingly popular 
with consumers. Such technology will exert 
further pressure on branching laws and inter-
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state restrictions, at least within metropolitan 
areas. Moreover, thrift institutions are ex-
periencing the merits of ATMs and shared 
computer technology, and they will expand 
their consumer services through these means. 
Technological change will intensify com-
petition for comprehensive personal cash-
management services. Money-market funds, 
brokerage houses, and large retailers all will 
be providing the type of service that deposi-
tory institutions also would provide were it 
not for regulations. These developments are 
hastening the removal of Reg. Q ceilings and 
putting immense pressure on product-line 
restrictions. Even if  desired, further regula-
tions or laws probably could not halt this 
trend, since such banking substitutes could 
take on infinite forms. For example, if reserve 
requirements were placed on money-market 
funds, most could qualify as savings vehicles 
-by  limiting withdrawals to three per month 
or by omitting checking-and as such would 
be subject to a zero reserve requirement. But 
the direction of  deregulation argues for a dif-
ferent solution-extending to banks and 
thrifts the deposit powers to compete with 
money-market funds and other pseudo-
banking institutions. 
When all issaid, the coming decade will bea 
difficult period for all financial institutions, 
especially small ones. The widespread de-
velopment of  electronic funds transfer is a 
certainty, and consumers increasingly will 
demand market returns on their savings and 
more unified personal cash-management ser-
vices. These trends will occur whether or not 
banking regulations are relaxed. In this envi-
ronment, our banking system will best be 
able to survive if  deregulation proceeds rap-
idly. Swift removal of Reg. Q is the single 
most important step, for then Glass-Steagall 
restrictions wi  II be of much less conse-
quence. But changing technology, as itfacili-
tates personal cash management, argues for 
even further deregulation of  product-line and 
geographic markets. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits -adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Defidency (  -), 
Borrowings 



























7/1/81  Dollar  Percent 
-1,142  13,064  9.5 
-1,090  13,289  11.5 
- 669  5,449  16.3 
- 2  6,047  12.9 
- 98  - 923  - 3.9 
- 287  '- 419  41.3 
6  - 117  - 1.9 
- 58  104  - 0.7 
-2,067  2,764  - 6.2 
571  - 2,156  - 6.7 
228  1,929  6.7 
761  19,925  32.1 
670  19,625  36.6 
721  10,744  48.8 
Weekended  Comparable 
7/1/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  10 
171  2 
n.a.  8 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
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